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With the release of the 2016 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) requirements 
for healthcare institutions to implement business continuity planning into their organizations by 
November 15, 2017, the focus of business continuity and disaster recovery planning solely for 
information services has now transitioned into an enterprise-wide requirement. Over the past decade, 
there have been increasing numbers of naturally occurring and man-made disasters that have 
significantly interrupted or altogether closed healthcare facilities, impacting the health and well-being of 
entire communities. This study examines the changing regulatory landscape that requires healthcare 
institutions to develop, maintain, and regularly test their business continuity plans in an effort to enhance 
their operational resiliency. After a retrospective review of regulations, guidelines, and best practices, 
this study pilots an addition to the Kaiser Permanente hazard vulnerability assessment (HVA) tool that is 
intended to enable healthcare organizations to objectively identify, prioritize, and maintain their business 
continuity and emergency management planning efforts through the identification of potential 
operational and financial impacts to healthcare facilities during and following disasters. The major 
benefits of this study are to identify the historical shortcomings of a healthcare facility’s hazard and risk 
identification processes and to facilitate the use of the information collected during that process. 
Identified inadequacies from past healthcare preparedness efforts will be used to form new meaningful 
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efforts to enhance the recognition of risks to healthcare organizations, in an effort to enhance their 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background and Need 
For more than a decade, a large number of man-made and naturally occurring disasters have 
devastated entire communities. Several of these disasters have crippled or destroyed healthcare facilities, 
leading to a disruption of healthcare services within those communities (Leonard, 2006). Hospitals and 
other healthcare facilities are part of the critical infrastructure within a community, making their 
existence and operational capabilities necessary to maintain the health of the population. For this reason, 
maintaining the operational resilience and financial viability of healthcare facilities during man-made or 
naturally occurring disasters is an important part of a community’s overall well-being (World Health 
Organization, 2008).  
The existing tools for prioritizing hazards and vulnerabilities have been ineffective at engaging 
healthcare institution executives in the planning and physical mitigation efforts. The below table 
summarizes the current tools available to hospitals and health systems to utilize in determining risks to 
their operations and overall resiliency (Braun B, 2006). 
 As interruptions of healthcare services due to man-made and naturally occurring disasters 
continue to increase in frequency and severity, more effective risk identification and prioritization tools 
are needed to advert these hazards from interrupting healthcare operations. The purpose of the hazard 
identification and risk assessment tools is to prioritize and to address the impact that various hazards 
could have on a healthcare facility (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2017).  
The Joint Commission (TJC) and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) does not 
recommend a method or tool to determine risks and hazards to healthcare institutions; however, the term 
“Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment” has been frequently used in Joint Commission regulatory 
manuals and guidance (Braun B, 2006). One of the most commonly used tools is the Kaiser Permanente 
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HVA tool. This tool, along with the University of California Los Angeles’ (UCLA) Hazard Risk 
Assessment Instrument, provides the framework for many healthcare organizations’ hazard assessments. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) have implemented various executive orders and legislative acts to outline the 
expectations that CMS has for healthcare providers and suppliers regarding their roles in a unified 
emergency preparedness system with community partners. 
Healthcare organizations need to remain operational before, during, and after disasters. To 
enhance the level of hazard planning conducted by healthcare organizations, CMS released the “Final 
Rule” on September the 8, 2016. The “Final Rule” mandate is officially referred to as the Medicare and 
Medicaid Programs’ “Emergency Preparedness Requirements for Medicare and Medicaid Participating 
Providers and Suppliers Final Rule.” The Final Rule “focuses on three key essentials necessary for 
maintaining access to healthcare during disasters or emergencies: safeguarding human resources, 
maintaining business continuity, and protecting physical resources” (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2017). This rule is meant to create consistent emergency preparedness requirements for the 
seventeen different healthcare facility provider types that receive funding from Medicare and Medicaid 
programs. It is understood that there are unique differences among healthcare facilities and their 
patients; however, the guidelines set forth by CMS were developed as a standard to cover all 
hazards/disasters while still addressing the differences in all settings. The assumption of these CMS 
requirements is intended to create appropriate planning and coordination with local agencies prior to and 
following a disaster.  
This new mandated effort is meant to bolster emergency planning coordination, response and 
recovery efforts among healthcare facilities and other critical community services during disasters, while 
meeting the intended outcome of the Final Rule. The release of the Final Rule was prompted by 
identified inadequacies of healthcare facilities to continue to provide needed health services during and 
immediately following disasters. The three main inadequacies identified by healthcare facilities were 
communication, contingency planning, and training of personnel (CMS, 2016).  
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Since the release of the new CMS rule, the leadership within healthcare facilities are striving to 
develop capabilities to maintain higher levels of operational resiliency during austere events. Sustaining 
access to healthcare and delivery of health services at normal operating capacities will ensure that 
healthcare facilities are able to maintain continuity of operations and business processes through 
enterprise-wide coordinated planning efforts. Due to the recent release of these new regulations, the 
adherence to the new regulations has not yet been determined. 
The objective of developing and maintaining higher levels of operational resiliency for 
healthcare organizations is aimed at sustaining access to healthcare at normal pre-disaster operating 
capacities. To ensure new emergency preparedness regulations are being followed, the new guidelines 
were incorporated into the CMS Conditions of Participation (CoPs), Conditions for Coverage (CoCs) 
and Conditions for Certification, meaning that the payments to healthcare facilities from CMS would be 
withheld, for those organizations that were found to not be adhering to the new regulations (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2017). The governance and enforcement of these new federal 
regulations of healthcare facilities are to be carried out by the CMS and recognized healthcare 
accrediting agencies, such as The Joint Commission (TJC). 
Many healthcare organizations and other Medicare/Medicaid participants prior to the release of 
the Final Rule of November 15, 2017, had not previously considered the operational interruption(s) of 
various services during a disaster in the detail that is needed, thus leaving providers financially and 
operationally vulnerable. Since the rollout of the Final Rule by CMS, healthcare entities have been given 
guidance through CMS and the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Readiness (ASPR) as to what 
defines business continuity planning and what goes into having a successful business continuity plan 
(BCP). Since the mandate was implemented in November 15, 2017, the the efforts required from 
healthcare executives in business continuity planning remain unclear. 
Business continuity planning 
Business continuity involves in-depth planning and coordination to enable an organization’s 
success, especially during disasters, when the demand for health services increases and the capacity to 
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offer those services decreases.  Business Continuity Planning (BCP) is defined as "plans, procedures, 
and resources to maintain and/or recover mission-critical processes and services impacted by an event 
causing an interruption of normal healthcare delivery operations" (Devlen, 2017). In addition to 
maintaining and recovering from austere events, BCP incorporates identification and mitigation 
strategies from risks such as cyber-attacks, human error, technological failures, and naturally occurring 
disasters. While previous considerations of operational interruption(s) were primarily focused on 
information services and technological failures, the new all encompassing approach of healthcare 
facilities towards business continuity planning is changing how healthcare organizations go about 
planning to increase their resiliency. The trend of combining business continuity and disaster recovery 
into a single term has resulted from a growing recognition that business and technology executives need 
to collaborate closely instead of developing plans in isolation (Target, 2017).  
Organizations that postpone business continuity planning are essentially operating in a reactive 
mode and devising “on-the-fly” plans to correct interruptions to services as they occur. BCP allows 
organizations the opportunity to continually improve their operations while decreasing the risk of harm 
to operational and financial impacts from various threats such as cyber-attacks, human error, 
technological failures, and natural disasters.  
The healthcare industry has not embraced enterprise-wide business continuity planning at the 
same level as government non-healthcare entities. Only after Congress passed the 1996 Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), did healthcare organizations begin to implement business 
continuity and disaster recovery planning into their organizations. In the past two decades since the 
introduction of HIPPA, business continuity planning in healthcare predominantly focused on the 
information services aspect of the business (Target, 2017). In the years following 1996, regulatory 
requirements of business continuity and disaster recovery were focused primarily on maintaining and 
securing protected healthcare information, as well as ensuring redundancies for the continual access to 
electronic health records (EHRs).  
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With communities and healthcare institutions continuing to experience a significant increase in 
the frequency and intensity of weather-related storms and the escalation of technological threats, a more 
proactive approach towards the creation of plans, procedures, and resources is needed. The goal of 
healthcare institutions should be to make mission-critical services more resilient to any austere event 
that may cause an interruption to normal healthcare operations. The magnitude that a disruption could 
have on a healthcare organization’s operations is still not something that is evaluated or determined by 
healthcare facilities, leaving potential gaps in continuity planning efforts. Figure 1 illustrates the 
equation used to determine the severity of a hazard, by subtracting mitigation efforts from the magnitude 
of the hazard to arrive at the severity score (Campbell, 2011). 
Figure 1. Hazard Severity Equation 
 
(Kaiser Permanente, 2017) 
The bigger the vulnerability, the bigger the impact natural or man-made disasters will have on 
the healthcare facility. The identification and classification of the various vulnerabilities are the initial 
steps for healthcare providers before they can determine the toll the hazard will have on the 
infrastructure and operating capacities for the healthcare facility. After the vulnerabilities are identified 
and their potential risk(s) to the organization known, prioritization of those identified risks to the facility 
can be made. The prioritization of vulnerabilities and risks to organizations helps develop mitigation 
strategies to minimize or eliminate the risks to the organization. Figure 2 illustrates the calculation to 
determine the relative risk; which is the identified hazard multiplied by the identified vulnerabilities 
(Campbell, 2011). 
 
MAGNITUDE MITIGATION SEVERITY 
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Figure 2. Relative Risk Equation 
 (Kaiser 
Permanente, 2017) 
As healthcare reform continues to evolve, providers continue to struggle to meet the heavy 
demand and costs of emergency care; this demand becomes exacerbated by large-scale disasters. 
Without the ability to continue health services, insufficient capacities and financial reserves may force 
hospitals to permanently close or curtail services. The integration of disaster risk reduction planning and 
construction into current and future healthcare strategies will be critical to protecting the operations and 
overall well-being of healthcare organizations. Additionally, coordination with and integration of 
community emergency managers and emergency responders into healthcare emergency planning and 
risk reduction efforts will help promote a state of resiliency for healthcare services. 
The ability to continue critical services during an emergency or austere event can be defined as 
“a healthcare facility’s ability to resist, absorb, and respond to an austere event while maintaining its 
critical health care functions, and then recover to its original state or adapt to a new one” (CMS, 2016). 
The newly released regulations require that hospitals embrace an all-hazards emergency management 
program, which includes mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery strategies to improve the 
overall readiness of hospitals for man-made or naturally occurring austere events. 
Problem Statement 
Changes included in the new CMS requirements, include member hospitals completing an 
annual risk assessment or hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA) (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2017). This annual requirement of conducting an HVA is an attempt to measure the risk that 
HAZARD VULNERABILITY RELATIVE RISK 
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man-made, naturally occurring, or technological hazards may have on a healthcare facility. The KP-
HVA and other risk scoring tools incorporate various scoring methodologies in determining the relative 
threat or risk scores, which are presented as percentages. The higher the percentages, the higher the risk 
to the organization; thus the hazards with the highest risk percentages are identified as the top hazards. 
The calculated scores are intended to prioritize and guide the healthcare organization in emergency 
planning and in correlating mitigation efforts for their facility. When this new requirement was released, 
there was no tool or guidance provided to healthcare organizations on how to complete this requirement. 
With the lack of guidance to complete this task, several healthcare organizations have devised their own 
tools and scoring metrics. This lack of guidance has led to confusion and uncertainty of healthcare 
organizations. The true priorities of threat, vulnerability, and risk remain unclear to many healthcare 
leaders. Furthermore, the multiple tools and scoring metrics have led to the underutilization of the HVA 
data at the hospital or community level (Toner, 2018).  
To date, the majority of research has retrospectively examined the impact of disasters on the 
inpatient setting and the ability to recover post-disaster (Radcliff, 2018). While there are many 
guidelines and commentaries related to how healthcare organizations should prepare and recover from 
disasters, few studies have examined the effectiveness and feasibility of hazard planning tools. 
Given the newness of the regulations, there is a limited evidence-base and resources available to 
organizations. There are two aims of this study. First, the study evaluates existing recommendations and 
frameworks for the identification, prioritization, and reduction of risks and vulnerabilities to healthcare 
operations and financial well-being before, during and after disaster events. Data sources will include 
government regulatory guidance, incident debriefs, journals, white papers, subject matter expert 
analysis, surveys, peer identified best practices, and identified concerns.  
Next using data from one health care organization, the study pilots a new tool for identifying and 
prioritizing business continuity planning efforts for healthcare systems or facilities, by using potential 
financial losses from interruptions to operations. This tool will be used with four different healthcare 
provider types: Acute Care Hospital (ACH), Outpatient Center (OC), Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) and 
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Medical Office Building (MOB). This tool will be used in conjunction with the KP-HVA tool that is 
used by the majority of healthcare organizations to determine the current risk levels of their facilities. 
Research has supported the need for the inclusion of business continuity planning considerations and 
projecting financial and operational impacts that identified hazards can have on healthcare 
organizations. The inclusion of this quantitative data is intended to enhance healthcare resiliency 
planning as well as the role healthcare leadership plays in this planning (Toner, 2018).  
A potential benefit of this tool is the ability for healthcare systems and individual facilities to 
better understand their loss of revenue and additional disaster-related expenses when the facility is 
unable to operate. Additionally, the tool is meant to involve leadership in resiliency planning, by 
providing operational and financial risks of hazards to the facility. Finally, understanding possible 
financial losses during disasters will help healthcare executives make informed decisions when 
determining facility operations, insurance amounts, business interruption insurance amounts, and 
mitigation measures which will allow a more financially secure facility (Stryckman, 2015). 
Research Questions 
1. What are the benefits for healthcare organizations to prioritize business continuity efforts within their 
organization to meet and/or exceed regulatory requirements? 
2. Can the addition of a quantifiable financial scoring tool into the existing KP-HVA tool, calculate 
potential financial losses to healthcare organizations during a disruption of services?  
3. How can healthcare organizations utilize the length of disruption and financial impacts from hazards to 











The collection of literature took place over six months, starting in August of 2017. The literature 
review began with keywords related to business continuity in healthcare in several academic and 
government databases. The inclusion criteria included literature from 2001 to present day. The terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, were the events that prompted a nationwide call to enhance 
preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery, in the healthcare industry. During 2001, the founding 
framework and requirement of healthcare facilities to identify and prioritize risks were established 
(Osman Dar, 2014). The prioritization of reviewed literature was given to peer-reviewed journals, as this 
is the basis of the data to be collected. A scoping review was also performed in order to provide an 
overview of the type, extent, and quality of information available regarding emergency management 
disaster planning and business continuity planning within various healthcare organizations.  
Searches for related documents were queried using the Medical University of South Carolina's 
online library, primarily the PubMed portal. The databases were searched using the terms "healthcare 
business continuity," “healthcare risk assessments,” and "healthcare resiliency." Additional searches 
utilized professional organization websites, government-sponsored data sharing repositories and 
mainstream search engines to determine published regulatory guidance documents, white papers, and 
historical documents. The terms used for searching for related information included "healthcare 
resiliency," "healthcare business continuity," "healthcare disaster recovery," “healthcare risk 
assessments,” and "healthcare continuity of operations." 
Articles were selected for review if the query terms were identified in the title or the abstract of 
the article within the given published timeframes. Articles that focused on healthcare outside of the 
United States were included. Countries outside of the United States were included because of their 
similar struggles with healthcare resiliency following disasters, while some countries, most notably 
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Australia have a robust framework of guidance for healthcare business continuity. Each of the articles 
was reviewed for related context to the topic of business continuity and/or continuity of operations in 
healthcare. These scoping reviews highlighted the way healthcare organizations maintain their 
operations at a minimum operating level before, during and after a man-made or natural disaster. 
Background 
With the changes to the federal emergency preparedness mandates in 2016 for certain healthcare 
entities that receive funding from the CMS, there is little existing framework in place for business 
continuity planning and guidance in the healthcare sector. As part of the conditions of participation 
(COP), CMS is now mandating that certain healthcare providers create, sustain, and exercise a 
continuity of operations plan (COOP) on an annual basis (CMS, 2017). This new mandate took effect on 
November 15,  2017, and thus healthcare organizations rushed to find guidance, literature and 
comprehensive templates to meet this need (McCarthy, Brewster, Hsu, Macintyre, & Kelen, 2017).   
With virtually everyone requiring some aspect of healthcare throughout their lives, the 
community’s dependency on healthcare services makes the overall resiliency of the healthcare provider 
an important aspect of the overall well-being of a community (Horowitz, 2017). The identification of 
risks and vulnerabilities that may impact a healthcare facility’s ability to continue critical health services 
is an important part of ensuring the resiliency of that healthcare facility. Vulnerabilities and risks that are 
not identified leave the healthcare organizations subject to unforeseen consequences that may damage or 
limit their capacity to render services during a disaster. While many risks or vulnerabilities may be 
difficult to completely eliminate, mitigation and planning may reduce these risks and vulnerabilities to 
more acceptable levels. The identification and prioritization of vulnerabilities and risks to the 
organization aid in the formation of mitigation and planning efforts to reduce the impacts those 
vulnerabilities will have on the organization (Spiekermann, Kienberger, Norton, Briones, & 
Weichchselgartner, 2015).  
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As the United States’ healthcare industry continues to see economic changes, organizations are 
being confronted with daily financial challenges due to the new landscape in healthcare economics. The 
General Accountability Office’s report on emergency preparedness, planning, and efforts released their 
findings of “State officials reported that it was difficult to continue to engage private-sector hospital 
chief executive officers in emergency preparedness activities at a time when these hospitals were facing 
day-to-day financial problems” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008, pp. 22-23). 
Healthcare executives and clinical leadership are entrusted to protect the financial well-being of their 
hospitals, so the use of funds without an immediate return on investment or a well-understood benefit to 
the hospital is often viewed with disdain (Stryckman, 2015). 
The risk perception of healthcare decision makers may also be negatively affected by the 
traditional HVA, which is completed annually. The presentation of identified top hazards without 
additional definition and meaning to healthcare executives leads to confusion on needed next steps. 
Without a clear outline of how those hazards could impact an organization, leaders have difficulty 
visualizing the potential impacts on the organization. A standard HVA primarily ranks hazards in their 
order of priority, instead of emphasizing the elements of vulnerability that would be better addressed to 
achieve true risk reductions (Osman Dar, 2014).The standard KP-HVA does not elaborate on 
operational or financial impacts that the ranked hazards could have on the organization and often lacks 
the needed information to engage leadership. 
Further complications to the decision makers’ decision is the uncertainty of the legal community 
in regard to emergency preparedness activities. There are few precedents for the liability of healthcare 
providers’ identifying risks to their facilities, regulatory compliance, and poor outcomes during 
disasters. The uncertainty of these issues creates precarious views on openly identifying the risks and 
vulnerabilities of the organization (Ransom, 2008). 
Impact of Disasters on the U.S. Healthcare Systems 
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 During a disaster, health facilities face closure, destroyed or damaged physical assets, displaced 
workforces and patients, as well as a chaotic operational revenue cycle. Once the event is over, facilities 
face possible reduced operations, capital limitations, and credit downgrades (Arain, 2015).  
The often immediate and unplanned reduction of services or the complete closure of a healthcare 
facility following a disaster, particularly in rural communities, creates both short-term and long-term 
health, social and economic impacts to a community. Even when outages last only a few hours, there is 
still a large financial impact that the healthcare organization incurs. For example, “one hour of electronic 
health record [EHR] downtime can cost a practice almost $488.00 per physician, per hour for the 
duration of the outage. It is estimated that the impact is approximately $43,000/00 per day for a large 
physician practice or a hospital unit” (Devlen, 2017 pg. 5). 
As disasters continue to impact healthcare systems throughout the United States with greater 
ferocity and frequency, there are a few disasters that stand out as “iconic” disasters that changed both the 
focus and regulatory landscape of healthcare preparedness. Hurricane Katrina of 2005, Super Storm 
Sandy of 2012, and Hurricane Harvey of 2017 were three storm systems that stand out as especially 
devastating to the healthcare community, causing both immediate and long-term impacts to multiple 
healthcare organizations in the three storms’ paths.  
 Healthcare organizations are not alone in experiencing post-disaster hardships; the health of the 
community as whole experiences adverse impacts from interruptions in health services, and this is 
especially true for those with chronic diseases (Icenogle, 2016). Patients with chronic diseases such as 
diabetes, human immunodeficiency virus, hypertension, and renal failure face an increase in mortality 
rates following disasters to this day, even after these medically fragile populations were identified back 
in 2004 during Hurricane Katrina (Icenogle, 2016).  
 With the interruption and/or closure of healthcare organizations and ancillary healthcare 
organizations, (i.e. pharmacies, dialysis clinics etc.) there have been seen consistent increases in 
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mortality and morbidity rates in communities following a disaster (Lin, 2014). Interruptions in 
healthcare services lead to a downfall in the overall health of the impacted community. Hospitals often 
see a pronounced increase in demand during disasters, due to the closures of other community health 
and specialty care services, such as dialysis (Lin, 2014). Following significant disasters some healthcare 
facilities struggle to stay open, let alone be effective. Future of facilities to remain operational shifts the 
burden of providing health services to the community to other surrounding area healthcare organizations 
that are still operational.  
 In addition to interruptions in providing services to the public, healthcare facilities have to 
contend with the immediate and often long-term financial struggles following a disaster. After Hurricane 
Harvey, the most costly natural disaster in the United States to date, the Texas Hospital Association 
surveyed its members impacted by Harvey. The disaster-related costs across the  92 hospitals were 
estimated to be $460 million. Of the $460 million, $380 million was for operating expenses and 
emergency work, $40 million for uncompensated care costs, and $40 million in other increased 
operating expenses (Sanborn, 2017).  
 Following disasters, healthcare facilities often report significant impacts to revenue and cash 
flow due to interruptions of billing and claim services, as well as from ancillary departments closing. In 
addition to interruptions in billing and filing claims, office closures, reduced hours of operation, 
canceled services, and decreased patient volumes all contribute to post-disaster financial stressors for 
organizations (Sanborn, 2017).  An example of individual facility losses during a hurricane is that of 
Northwell Health in New York City, NY. Northwell Health reported a $13 million total loss during 
Hurricane Irene, with $4 million being attributed to labor and supplies and $9 million to revenue lost 
from hospital closures (Sanborn, 2017). 
 The aforementioned and unmentioned disasters of the past have all identified social and 
healthcare gaps in the impacted communities, with a continued need for education, planning, and 
mitigation efforts to minimize the impacts that disasters have on both healthcare facilities and the 
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medically fragile populations within the community (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). 
The closures or diminished capacities of healthcare organizations due to financial and operational strain 
from these disasters are something that continues to occur, despite efforts to reduce risks and 
vulnerabilities of these organizations from disasters.  
Disaster Planning Guidelines and Recommendations 
 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) is responsible for the preparation, response, and recovery aspects of 
health services, following an emergency or disaster. ASPR is responsible for developing and guiding 
healthcare preparedness and response capability guidance for healthcare organizations and emergency 
responders; this guidance is associated with an annual healthcare preparedness grant that is administered 
through HHS-ASPR (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). ASPR, 
CDC, CMS, FEMA and other federal agencies jointly collaborate and release strategic planning every 
five years to enhance healthcare preparedness, as well as response and recovery capabilities of 
healthcare organizations throughout the United States and its territories.   
 ASPR’s 2017-2022 release of capabilities outlines the following four capabilities:  
- Capability 1: Foundation for Health Care and Medical Readiness 
- Capability 2: Health Care and Medical Response Coordination 
- Capability 3: Continuity of Health Care Service Delivery 
- Capability 4: Medical Surge  
The four capabilities are intended to provide a guiding light for healthcare organizations to focus 
their efforts on creating and sustaining these capabilities in order to enhance their preparedness and 
response efforts (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). Each of the 
capabilities mentioned above contains “objectives.” The objectives and associated activities are what the 
healthcare organization should implement to enhance their capability.  
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The following capabilities, objectives, and activities highlight the current requirements for 
healthcare organizations. ASPR’s guidance promotes a national focus on improving patient outcomes 
during emergencies that exceed the day-to-day capacities of health and emergency response systems. 
The purpose of the 2017-2022 HPP guidance is to incentivize diverse healthcare organizations with 
differing priorities and objectives to work together collaboratively to promote healthcare delivery system 
resilience in the aftermath of emergencies. The objectives and capabilities outline the ideal state of 
readiness in the United States.  












1. Establish and Operationalize a Healthcare Coalition 
2. Identify Risk and Needs 
3. Develop a Healthcare Coalition Preparedness Plan 
4. Train and Prepare the Healthcare and Medical Workforce 






1. Develop and Coordinate Healthcare Organization and Coalition Plans 
2. Utilize Information Sharing Procedures and Platforms 





1. Identify Essential Functions for Healthcare Delivery 
2. Plan for Continuity of Operations 
3. Maintain Access to Non-Personnel Resources during an Emergency  
4. Develop Strategies to Protect Healthcare Information Systems 
5. Protect Responders’ Safety and Health  
6. Plan for and Coordinate Healthcare Evacuation and Relocation 
7. Coordinate Healthcare Delivery System Recovery 
4 Medical Surge 1. Plan for a Medical Surge 2. Respond to a Medical Surge  
          Source: ASPR, 2017 
Some of the objectives and activities within these four capabilities are particularly critical for 
health care hazard and disaster planning. “The goal of Capability 1 is to ensure that healthcare 
organizations collaborate with community stakeholders to  identify hazards and risks, and to prioritize 
and address gaps through planning, training, exercising, and managing resources (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017, p. 7). The primary focus of the activities in this section 
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is that healthcare facilities integrate into their communities emergency planning and response efforts,  
sharing identified hazards and risks to their community with one another.   
Key objectives within Capability 1 include the completion of an annual HVA. This activity is meant to 
determine a healthcare facility’s vulnerabilities related to naturally occurring, man-made, or technological 
hazards affecting the facility and operations. The facility should identify and prioritize their risks and 
vulnerabilities, while attempting to reduce those risks through mitigation measures (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017, p. 13). Also under this capability, healthcare facility 
leadership should assess and identify regulatory compliance requirements that are applicable to normal 
operating levels, with the intention of enhancing planning for, responding to and recovering from disasters.  
Another activity in this stage is that healthcare facilities engage health care executives in reducing risk, and 
addressing facility and community needs before, during, and after disasters.  
      The goal of capability 3 is for healthcare facilities to provide uninterrupted, optimal medical care to all 
populations in the face of damaged or disabled health care infrastructure. Facilities should regularly train, 
exercise and prepare to meet the needs of their patients and community following a disaster. Response and 
recovery efforts should be completed simultaneously to expedite the return to normal operations (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). Under this capability, healthcare leadership 
teams are instructed to identify essential functions for healthcare delivery. Mission essential functions 
(MEFs) should identify and prioritize services to be restored following a disruption. Inpatient services, 
outpatient services, skilled nursing facilities, and other health care organizations should all be considered in 
this type of planning. Planning for continuity of services is both required and needed for healthcare 
organizations, to be resilient from disasters. Continuity of operations planning should include operational 
and financial planning during disasters and disruptions of normal operations. In addition, healthcare 
facilities should plan to be able to maintain operational and financial functions during and after an 
emergency or disaster. Essential business processes and financial security should be the basis of this 
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planning to allow the health care organization to resume the critical services of caring for the community 
which they serve in a timely manner. 
Description and Background of Kaiser Permanente HVA tool 
 Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, nationwide emergency preparedness efforts were 
undertaken to enhance readiness for disasters. That year, the Joint Commission required healthcare 
organizations to complete an annual hazard vulnerability analysis or risk assessment as part of their 
triannual certification cycle. The purpose of this requirement was to provide a framework for hospitals 
to prioritize their emergency planning efforts (McCarthy, Brewster, Hsu, Macintyre, & Kelen, 2017). 
The American Society for Healthcare Engineering (ASHE) of the American Hospital Association 
created the first standard HVA tool, and the Kaiser Permanente tool expanded upon the guidance and 
scope of hazards that healthcare facilities should consider. 
 Emergency management preparedness and planning efforts rely on the assumptions made during 
their creation and annual reviews. Objective data, instead of opinions alone is needed to create a solid 
foundation for emergency planning and preparedness efforts. The Joint Commission defines HVA as 
“the identification of hazards and the direct and indirect effects these hazards may have on the hospital” 
(TJC, 2018).  
 This tool outlines various potential hazards that could impact a healthcare facility. There are four 
choices: N/A, Low, Moderate or High, to be determined by an inter-professional group of healthcare 
workers for each of the events or hazards listed in the tool. The tool starts with the scoring of the 
probability of the event occurring or having an impact on the facility. After determining the probability, 
the severity was determined by scoring the three impacts: human, property, and business. To complete 
the severity score, the three mitigation categories are scored: preparedness, internal response, and 
external response. The higher the mitigation scores, the less impact or relative threat the event would 
have on the facility. The basic calculation is outlined as Severity = (Magnitude-Mitigation), showing 
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that the magnitude score would be countered by the mitigation score. The final measurement combines 
the probability score and severity scores to determine the overall risk/relative threat score, which is 
represented as a percentage. After all the events are scored, the highest overall risk/relative threat scores 
would be the most hazardous to that particular facility (Toner, 2018).  
The above outlined Kaiser Permanente HVA tool met the requirements of the Joint Commission 
and has since been adopted by the majority of healthcare organizations and non-healthcare emergency 
preparedness departments due to its ease of use and application across multiple different types of 
healthcare entities (Redwood-Campbell, 2011). One of the major outlined benefits of the KP-HVA is the 
incorporation of community organization factors and individual organizations into a combined tool.  
 The information that is calculated by utilizing this risk scoring methodology is often collected 
and filed in binders, awaiting regulatory audit(s). The intent of enhancing preparedness, planning, 
mitigation, and response efforts within a healthcare institution by the identification of hazards and risks 
that healthcare institutions may face is thus lost. While this tool identifies a facility's top hazards based 
on the scoring methodology and inputs, this tool does not capture the attention of healthcare leadership 
(Redwood-Campbell, 2011). Understanding and buy-in of leadership are needed to truly evoke a culture 
of disaster preparedness and continuity of operations despite disasters. 
Other Hazard Identification Tools 
 While the Kaiser Permanente HVA is the most commonly used tool by healthcare providers, 
private and public sector agencies, there are numerous other tools that are designed to capture risk 
measurements and hazard identification. These tools all take a slightly different approach in calculating 
risks to an organization. While the majority of the tools used the KP-HVA tool as a guiding document to 
frame their variations in data collection and scoring methodologies, Table 2 illustrates the inconsistent 
nature of the current HVA process for healthcare organizations. Each tool produces slightly different 




Analysis of Commonly Used Risk and Hazard Scoring Tools 
 The most commonly used risk and hazard scoring tools have been collected; and have been 
identified with the intended purpose, calculation method, and limitations for each of the tools. The 
collected limitations in each of the tools have been analyzed to determine the reoccurring gaps in 
existing tools, and from this analysis the most commonly identified gaps have been incorporated into the 
proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool. The review of existing hazard identification and risk assessment 
tools confirms that there are no tools that produce a quantitative analysis of the potential financial losses 
that healthcare providers could incur during an interruption of services. The importance of this finding is 
that this is a key measure for healthcare executives to fully understand and take action to mitigate the 
risks and vulnerabilities that are identified by these tools to protect their operations and financial well-
being. Additionally, the review of tools concludes that the majority of those in existence took their initial 
















Table 2: Summary of Existing Healthcare Hazard Vulnerability Assessment Tools 





To provide an analysis of health-
related impacts of hazards that 
can occur. The tool helps 
planning efforts for those 
emergencies. 
Risk-based on probability and 
impact severity. Measures five 
major domains. 
Public Health Specific.  
Multiple sources or various 
users may skew data. 
 
Drexel University 
School of Public 
Health. Based on 






Assess and prioritize planning 
and mitigation efforts for 
hazards.  Tool offers a health-
focused mechanism to identify 
and improve an agency’s 
capability to prepare, respond, 
and recover from potential 
threats.  
Focuses on relative perceived risk, 
by user-provided input scores. 
Scoring is based on probability, 
severity (increased 
mortality/morbidity), impact on 
healthcare community and the 
protective values of internal and 
community response readiness.  
Does not incorporate 
baseline data, does not 
address at-risk populations. 
Los Angeles 
Department of Public 
Health. Based on 






Provide guidance in determining 
the likelihood of hazards 
occurring, community 
vulnerabilities, and community 
resources. Potential consequences 
are estimated in this tool. 
Four steps: the probability of 
mishap, the severity of 
consequences, scoring of the 
consequences, and risk analysis. 
Public health-specific, 
cannot easily enter data or 
manipulate the tool, does 
not automatically generate 
calculations/graphs/charts, 
and does not address at-
risk populations. 
UCLA Center for 







To identify hazards, through a 
systematic approach, that may 
affect demand for hospital 
services or ability to provide 
those services. 
Probability and impact of threats, 
mitigation, and preparedness 
determine which level of risk 
exists for each hazard. Risk scores 
will be analyzed and used to 
prioritize planning, mitigation, 
response, and recovery efforts. 
Hospital and healthcare 
facility-specific. Does not 
provide guidance manual, 
instructions on the tool 
does not comprehensive, 







Comprehensive analysis of the 
health, property, and business 
impacts of various hazards. This 
tool is meant to prioritize 
planning efforts, rate four phases 
of emergency management, and 
illustrate the operational and 
regulatory impact of events. 
Attempts to align emergency 
management and operational 
continuity efforts. 
Evaluation of three different topics 
for varying scoring includes risk 
occurrence, risk response, and 
non-weighted. 
Does not address at-risk 
populations 
Children’s Hospital of 
Colorado. Based on 






To provide resources and 
templates that will assist in 
locating needed information and 
guidance related to the 
identification of threats and 
hazards and subsequent risk 
assessments.  
Broken down into areas of 
research to facilitate understanding 
of risk assessments. This has no 
calculations or outcomes. 
Emergency Management 
Specific, toolkit-guidance 
document rather than a 
tool, does not generate 
calculations or graphs  
Developed by FEMA 
Source: ASPR TRACIE 
Summary of Existing Tools 
         Several reoccurring limitations were identified in the existing risk and hazard assessment tools 
used by healthcare organizations. First, the existing tools do not project financial losses or length of 
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disruptions. Next, with the exception of the KP-HVA tool, none of the tools automatically generates or 
calculates key factors, making it more cumbersome for administrators to enter data and visualize results. 
The tools also lack comprehensive data collection that shows the entire impact the identified hazards 
could have on the facility. Finally, the majority of tools do not address at-risk populations or baseline 
data. The reoccurring limitations identified above were used to create and pilot the proposed addition to 

























The study uses a scoping review of published regulatory guidance, news articles, and best 
practices for healthcare business continuity to answer the study questions. This exploratory method has 
been used for new and emerging topics such as healthcare business continuity. Content analysis has been 
used to compare regulatory guidance and existing published best practices and recommendations. 
Additionally, the identified trends from the research will be used to construct proposed additions and 
variations to the existing KP-HVA tool to enhance the applicability of conducting risk assessments for 
healthcare organizations. 
Data Analysis 
 The extraction of relevant information to healthcare business continuity attracted from the 
aforementioned search engines and repositories has been analyzed based on the relevance of the 
information to business continuity in healthcare operations. Best practices, recommendations, and 
government findings have been examined to determine their potential contribution to healthcare systems 
understanding, creating, implementing, or maintaining a business continuity plan. This information was 
compared to the existing tools to identify gaps as shown in Table 2. During the review of existing 
literature, documented issues, theories and suggestions for improving the practice, implementation, and 
support to business continuity efforts have been extracted to be considered in the recommendations for 
the future state of business continuity in healthcare. Identified best practices in the literature review have 
been integrated into the proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool.   
Development of Proposed Tool – Facility Impact Analysis Tool 
 Following the scoping literature review and the evaluations of existing hazard vulnerability 
assessments and risk assessment tools, the accumulated findings have been used to address the identified 
shortfalls of the current HVA process, by proposing an addition to the existing KP-HVA tool. From the 
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literature have aided in the creation of a pilot tool to minimize the subjectivity of the established HVA. 
This proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool has been constructed in collaboration with the Director of 
Business Continuity and Emergency Pareparedness at Kaiser Permanente, along with subject matter 
experts in the field of healthcare business continuity and preparedness.   
The additional section of the KP-HVA may facilitate an enhanced role in the HVA process and 
better understanding of the data. The pilot tool maintains the existing framework and ranking of 
potential hazards to an individual facility from the standard KP-HVA tool, while introducing new fields 
to determine the length of disruption and financial impacts from each of the identified top hazards. 
Traditionally, an inter-professional group participates in the annual KP-HVA process, usually including 




- Emergency Management 
 
After completion of the KP-HVA tool, the healthcare leadership team will use their facility’s 
annual budget to separate the annual revenue projections for inpatient services, outpatient services and 
emergency room, and/or any applicable services at their facility. The annual revenue projections are to 
be inputed into the identified columns, with the top ten ranked hazards from the standard KP-HVA 
automatically populated after completion of the standard KP-HVA. The three service types are separated 
throughout the tool, allowing the unique characteristics of each of the service types to be captured, while 
still allowing an accurate projection of the impacts to the entire facility. Each of the aforementioned 
service types have been found to operate and to be impacted differently during disasters; therefore they 
have been separated.  
Next, the finance tab has the following new fields for operational impacts from the identified 
hazards: hours operational each week, projected number of hours impacting services, percentage of 
operations able to be maintained, percentage of services to be recovered, and total additional expenses 
from the disaster. The fields are to be completed by the same group that completes the standard KP-
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HVA. The value of each of the fields is to be determined based off historical information, financial 
information, facility characteristics, and operational capacities. 
All the information that is inputted into the “finance” tab is automatically transferred over to the 
“summary” tab where the scored length of disruption for inpatient, outpatient, and ER is illustrated in 
hours for each of the top ranked hazards. Additionally, the financial losses for each of the service lines 
and entire facility are calculated, again by the different hazards. The final feature of the summary tab is 
the breakdown of hourly revenue for each service type, not based off any specific hazard. This 
breakdown provides financial loss projections to leadership for any event that causes interruptions to 
operations by illustrating the average revenue captured each hour the service type/facility is operational.  
Lastly, two additional fields have been added to the “data” tab of the KP-HVA tool for capturing 
the actual length of the disruption and/or fiancnial impacts of events that have occurred in that calendar 
year. This capturing of actual data from the length of disruptions and financial impacts will help in the 
construction of more accurate projections of the impacts that hazards will have on healthcare facilities.  
Since the tool could be utilized by seventeen different healthcare provider types identified by the 
CMS that are required to complete an annual HVA, it must be adaptable to the different service lines of 
each facility. Three different distinct facility service types have been identified, due to their unique 
characteristics during various disasters.  Based on the operational service lines, each facility may 
complete one or more of the following service modules: Inpatient, Outpatient, and Emergency Room. 
Leaders of each of the three service types will identify the projected length of disruption from the 
hazard, as well as input their unique information related to operational and financial impacts to their 
facility.  
Sample Selection 
The proposed additions to the KP-HVA tool were piloted using four different healthcare provider 
types. The sites were purposefully selected using a convenience sample of one healthcare organization 
located in the Southeastern United States. The participating healthcare system is the largest in their state, 
with locations in 12 counties. All the facility participants were part of the same healthcare system. The 
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sample was selected to test the feasibility and usability of the additions to the KP-HVA tool in the 
following healthcare settings: Acute Care Hospital, Skilled Nursing Facility, Outpatient Surgery Center, 
and Physician Practice. The pilot tests were conducted in conjunction with the annual HVA during the 
first quarter of the calendar year of 2018. The pilot testing for the four different provider-types 
incorporated the new additions to the tool, using the same methods of group facilitation to score each 
hazard’s impact and preparedness measurements on the organization. 
Data Collection Procedure 
Data to test the tool was inputted into a survey database during the annual HVA assessment 
meeting. Each facility assigned an appropriate person or group of persons with access to the operational 
and financial information to fill out this survey. The determination of answers to questions was made by 
facility leadership, financial department representative(s), facility representatives and emergency 
preparedness officials, using historical data and best projections of potential impacts to the facility. Each 
facility was instructed to bring to the meeting their 2018 annual budget separated into three distinct 
service types within that organization: Inpatient, Outpatient, and Emergency Room. The three different 
service types were determined based on their unique characteristics and role during disasters (Horowitz, 
2017). While some of the participating organizations had all three service types or only one service type, 
they were all able to successfully complete the piloting with no deviations needed in collecting and 
determining the score of the HVA or financial information. The identification of the facilities that 
participated in the survey was omitted to protect the proprietary financial information and identified 
vulnerabilities for each of the facilities. 
The integration of the proposed tool with the KP-HVA tool was done by collecting financial and 
operational information from the facility. The leadership was asked to identify the top three hazards that 
were potential risks to their facility and in that community. Potential hazards included active shooter, 
bomb threat, dam failure, drought, earthquake, fire, flood, gas leak, generator failure, hurricane, IT 
system outage, pandemic, tornado, and tsunami. Next, the facility leadership scored each hazard on the 
impacts it would have on humans, property; then the facility scored their preparedness, internal response 
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and external response capabiltiies, which combined created the risk score. The additional data was 
collected in an added tab “finance” that captured information to determine potential financial and 
operational losses during interruptions of service for each of the top ten hazards. The questions were 
used to determine the projected length of disruption for each of the top hazards and additional costs that 
the facility could incur from that hazard. The collected financial information was inputed into the tool, 
with the scoring of length of disruption and additional expenses to determine the financial loss that the 
hazard would have on the facility. 
Immediately following the completion of the annual KP-HVA with proposed new changes, the 
chief operating officer or ranking facility leader was provided a four-question survey (Table 3), asking 
about their perspective on the feasibility and applicability of this addition to the KP-HVA. The questions 
of this survey were as follows: Does new data enhance your knowledge of financial/operational 
vulnerabilities from disasters?, Does new data make KP-HVA more meaningful to your position?, Do 
you feel as though this new additional data will help make a stronger case for mitigation efforts?, Did 
additional data input take less than 15 minutes to complete? The intent of this survey was to determine 
the immediate reaction and usability of the proposed additions to the leader of the identified facilities. 
Additionally, an informal discussion with the participating group and facility leader was conducted, 
focusing on their perceptions, recommendations, and applicability regarding the proposed additions to 
the KP-HVA tool.    
 Finally, twenty-three healthcare and community members of a regional consortium were engaged 
in a written survey during a quarterly meeting to determine their perceptions on conducting their own 
risk and hazard vulnerability assessments. Additionally, the survey asked about its usefulness in 
measuring various operational and financial risks. Of the twenty-three participants, all but one of the 
participants utilized the standard KP-HVA.  
 The regional consortium is comprised of multidisciplinary healthcare and community members 
that are responsible for providing health services or emergency response before, during and following a 
disaster. The survey of these individuals had these five questions: Do you use the data from your risk 
 33 
assessment or HVA tool to prioritize business continuity planning?, Do you use the data from your risk 
assessment or HVA tool to determine potential financial losses during a disaster?, Do you determine the 
potential length of disruption of health services for the facility?, Based on the identified hazards in the 
HVA, do you feel as though the current summary of indormation on the risk assessment or HVA is 
meaningful to facility leadership? Each question had three different response choices: Yes, No, or Not 
Sure. The survey was completed at the beginning of a quarterly meeting. Each of the twenty-three 
members filled out the survey, with some members representing more than one organization type. The 
members that were representing more than one organization type were scored under both sections. 
 Surveys were collected from the participants following the meeting, results being shown in Table 
4. The surveys were reviewed for any missed questions or anomalies by the participants, with all 
questions being answered and no observed anomalies. To limit any potential bias that background or 
discussions may have on the participants’ answers, the participants were given instructions on the 
general overview and intention of the survey, but no discussions surrounding the questions was 
conducted.  
Pilot Study  
 The data collected via the survey was then inputted into the pilot KP-HVA tool, in the financial 
tab where the sum projections of the financial losses and length of disruptions are outlined for 
incorporation into the overall KP-HVA tool’s summary. All of the calculations to determine the hourly 
loss of revenue were embedded into the tool, along with instructions to outline the equation and the 
process to arrive at those numbers. The projected length of disruption and financial losses will 
accompany the top three hazards; the financial loss rate is calculated by the hour for disruption of 
services used in any of the hazards in the KP-HVA tool. There was a facilitated discussion of the groups 
completing the new additions to the KP-HVA tool in which they were encouraged to present their initial 
perceptions of ease of use, as well as future implications of collected information and usability in an 
open forum. The notes from the facilitated discussions were captured, and some clarifying questions 
were asked to ensure appropriate understanding of items being discussed. 
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          CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Pilot Tool Results 
During this pilot project, a financial director for each of the four facility types participated in the 
scoring of the KP-HVA. The different organization types were used to capture the unique characteristics 
of each different provider type, as well as to ensure the usability of this addition to the KP-HVA tool 
with the different provider types. The four different healthcare provider types used for the pilot study are 
listed in Table 3.  Each of the participating facilities was not for profit, but each of the facilities provides 
a mix of different services.  








Rural Acute Care Hospital (ACH) 
 The acute care hospital studied is a licensed 45-bed facility that is in a rural area, and that is part 
of a larger healthcare system. The inpatient and emergency room services are operational 24/7 a day, 
365 days a year while the outpatient services have extended Monday-Friday operational business hours. 
This hospital offers the following services:  
- General Medicine Beds (Inpatient) 
- Long Term Acute Care (LTAC – Inpatient) 
- Rehabilitative Services (Outpatient/Inpatient) 
- Diagnostics and Imaging (Outpatient/Inpatient) 












45 Not For 
Profit 




120 Not For 
Profit 















No Yes No 
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Suburban Outpatient Surgery Center (OPSC) 
 The outpatient surgery center that was used in the study and is located in a busy urban area, 
which has four outpatient operating suites. This center conducts non-acute outpatient surgeries five days 
a week, with traditional business hours. This center offers the following services:  
- General Surgery  
- GI Surgical Procedures  
- Ophthalmology  
 
Rural Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) 
 The skilled nursing facility that was used in the pilot project has a licensed bed capacity of 120 
beds and is located in a rural county.. This facility is an inpatient facility that does not offer outpatient 
rehabilitative services. This facility is budgeted and regularly operates at 95% of their capacity 
throughout the year. This facility offers the following services:  
- Skilled Nursing (Inpatient) 
- Rehabilitative Services (Inpatient) 
 
Metropolitan Physician Practice – Family Medicine (PP) 
  The identified physician practice for this pilot project has twelve active exam rooms that 
specialize in internal medicine and is located in an urban area. The practice employs 15 full-time 
physicians, with other advanced practitioners as part of their staffing. The practice is operational 
Monday-Friday with traditional business hours. This facility offers the following services:  
- Primary Care – Family Medicine (Outpatient) 
 
Pilot Study Results 
Top Identified Hazards  
All four facilities were able to collect the necessary data to complete the pilot modules of the 
KP-HVA. There was a wide range of hazards selected by the four facilities for this module. The most 
commonly identified hazards were HVAC Failure (n=2), and tornado (n=2). Other potential hazards 
were communication/telephone failure, internal flood, inclement weather, IT system outage, generator 
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failure, water interruption, and epidemic. The hazards were identified by using historical data of the 
listed hazards that have directly or indirectly affected the operations of that particular facility.  
The historical data for each of the facilities was collected from the South Carolina Emergency 
Management Division (SCEMD) and the county emergency management department where the facility 
is located. Participants were given instructions to score any hazard that occurs more than once a year as 
a “high” probability, hazards that occur every 2-3 years as “moderate” probability, hazards that occur 3 
or more years as a “low” probability, and any hazard that is not possible as “N/A”.  
Two similarities were noted in the results; both were with alike provider types. Both the inpatient 
facilities, ACH and SNF had listed tornado as one of the top three hazards to their facility, with the ACH 
ranking the tornado as the highest risk and the SNF ranking it the third highest risk. The rationale and 
discussion behind ranking tornado in the top three for both inpatient facilities was that a tornado can 
cause significant damage, facility evacuations, and long-term inability to utilize the facility. 
Additionally, both of the outpatient facilities ranked HVAC failure as their third highest ranking hazard 
for their facilities. HVAC was chosen in the top three due to the inability to render any services while 
the HVAC was not operational. The outpatient surgery center and physician practice would elect to 
cancel appointments and surgeries until the HVAC system was restored. The outpatient surgery center 
added that they would not be able to maintain humidity levels, or ensure sterile environments for their 
patients in the event of this type of failure, while the physician practice cited that the patients’ comfort 
and satisfaction would be greatly impacted.  
Estimated Length of Disruptions 
 The length of disruptions is estimated in the total hours that the facility is closed or unable to 
render services during the different hazards. The length of disruptions is calculated in hours, as some 
disasters are short-lived, while others are calculated in days. The identification of hazards that would 
completely disrupt services, along with the length of time during which they could disrupt services is 
especially important in the continuity planning and risk mitigation, as this calculation results in the 
highest operational and financial impacts. 
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 Both the inpatient facilities scored the disruption length of services from each of their hazards as 
lower than their outpatient counterparts. The inpatient facilities scored the length of disruptions as low 
due to the fact that their patient population would remain in their care, unless evacuation was warranted. 
The SNF did estimate that both the water interruption and tornado would cause 10 hours of disruption to 
their services, specifically inpatient rehab. The SNF identified that while the rehabilitative services are 
for inpatient use only, the providers for those services are outsourced from a different company, which 
would likely result in cancellation of rehabilitation patient services. The cancelled services would not be 
billable to insurance, unless they were rescheduled, which would be at the discretion of the provider. 
 Both the outpatient facilities estimated full-day closures (10 hours) for their third highest ranking 
hazard, HVAC failure. Communication/telephone failure and epidemic were estimated to not cause any 
disruption to operations, the internal flood was estimated to disrupt 30 hours, and severe weather was 
estimated to disrupt 20 hours. Both the facilities indicated that in both circumstances they would attempt 
to reschedule or reassign appointments to an unimpacted same facility type if possible, which they have 
done in the past successfully.  
Increased Additional Expenses  
 Increased additional expenses were broken down into four different categories for groups to 
estimate potential costs based on the hazards they were scoring. The four categories were increased 
labor costs, increased supplies and consumable costs, increased contractual expenses (excluding labor) 
and increased repair and replacement costs. These four categories were identified due to their 
applicability to historical damage categorization by FEMA, and discussion of them in the literature 
review. 
The estimated additional expenses for both the inpatient facilities (ACH and SNF) were 
significantly higher than the two facilities that solely provided outpatient services. The participants for 
each of the inpatient services referenced the need for them to continually maintain sufficient levels of 
care to their patients, throughout any disaster. The increased labor (estimated to be $5,000-$15,000 per 
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incident/per service type) and contract costs ($10,000-$25,000 per incident/per service type) were 
identified as two “major additional expenses that usually accompany disasters.”  
The research showed that the increased repair and replacement costs estimated for HVAC failure 
were the same for both the PP and OPSC, and HVAC failure was ranked as their third highest hazard. 
The potential reasoning for the same projections for the replacement/repair costs was the same 
engineering/facility representative was present for both the facility types.  
The feedback from the hospital group idicated that knowing the hourly loss of revenue rate as 
$16,162.00 per hour for all services would be beneficial during and after a disaster to financial analysts 
and organization leaders. The group went on to add that currently they are able to track the number of 
surgeries/procedures rescheduled; however they are unable to determine if those rescheduled 
appointments were kept. 
Estimated Percentage of Normal Operations to be Maintained During a Disaster 
 The estimation of normal operations to be maintained during a disaster is aimed at capturing the 
lesser percentage of disruptions to services, instead of the total closure of the facility as documented in 
the total disruption of services. The estimated reductions in services is a way to quantify the impact that 
hazards can have on the various types of services.  
Again, there were notable differences between inpatient and outpatient facilities, with the 
inpatient facilities showing a lesser impact of operations from disasters than outpatient facilities. As 
previously outlined, inpatient services maintain their services unless there is an evacuation of all or part 
of the patient population. The outpatient services scored the ability to maintain services at 0% for all of 
their top hazards, with the exception of HVAC failure, which was scored at 25% capacity and 85% for 
communication/telephony failure for the physician practice. The physician practice concluded that a 
telephone failure could impact future appointments being scheduled, but would have minimal impact on 
the current day’s operations. Additionally, the physician practice rated the HVAC failure at 25% due to 
some patients choosing to be seen, regardless of this failure. 
Estimated Percentage of Services That Could be Recovered 
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 Capturing the difference between total revenue loss and temporary revenue loss from an 
interruption in services, estimated percentage of services being recovered is intended to identify the 
services that the facility can recover following the interruption of services. The calculation of services 
recovered is illustrated as a percentage which is subtracted from the service type revenue losses during 
the interruption.  
 Both inpatient and outpatient groups commented the majority of their services could be 
rescheduled; however the financial directors admitted this data is something that is not readily available 
nor has it been tracked in the past. The participants mentioned that this capability could be present in 
their EHR, but if so, it could only outline the initial rescheduling of the appointment, not the participant 
keeping the appointment.  
The outpatient services identified that the majority of their services were able to be recovered or 
rescheduled, as their caseload was predominantly elective cases. Additionally, the outpatient services 
did again mention that they would attempt to reassign patient appointments to other unaffected similar 
locations, and/or extend operating hours of their site upon resuming operations. Inpatient services again 
mentioned that their inpatient populations would remain in the facility, causing them to score all of their 
recovered services at 100%.   
Stakeholder Feedback 
 Results of the post-survey group discussion include the following themes. First, each facility 
found the additional information insightful into the impacts of the hazards, citing that historically they 
had not considered the implications that these hazards could have on their facilities. Each setting 
identified specific features and benefits that were more useful than others. A common theme was that 
the additional information gives leadership and managers a basis to make informed decisions during 
disasters. Specifically, skilled nursing and outpatient representatives felt that projecting additional 
expenses from disasters is helpful for managers to understand. These two stakeholder types also 
indicated the additional tracking of financial and operational disruption would be a useful addition when 
completing the annual KP-HVA. The family practice group has never completed an annual KP-HVA, as 
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this is a new CMS requirement for the setting. The physician practice respondent also noted that 
differentiating between appointments that are rescheduled and those that are fulfilled would be 
beneficial to know and this capability does not currently exist. Although this is their first time 
completing this type of exercise, the practice leadership views this information favorably, and believes it 
will be helpful when determining closures or alterations in operational hours. 
  Discussions from the outpatient surgery group were focused on the decision-making process of 
closures and alterations of traditional schedules during disasters, with some desire from the group to 
more firmly outline timelines for making these decisions, as several of their patients have pre-surgery 
preparation activities at their residence, which would not be needed if cancellations were to take place. 
The group also discussed the post-disaster rescheduling of patients, factoring in the potential need for 
increasing hours of operations to ensure that the patients receive their care in a timely manner, for their 
surgery schedules are set many months in advance. Lastly, the group considered the potential need to 
increase operating hours to their site, as well as the feasibility of shifting canceled cases to other 
affiliated surgery centers.   
All facility respondents agreed that a reference table of previous disasters and the average length 
of disruption the disasters caused similar institutions would be useful when projecting the length of 
disruption. The description and intention of the new fields in the “data” table of the KP-HVA tool were 
described to the groups, with the groups agreeing that over time the collection of similar events could 
help to limit the subjectivity of this particular scoring field.  
Each financial director voiced concerns about the subjectivity of scoring the estimated length of 
disruptions for each of their identified top hazards, with some disagreements and questions being voiced 
by the participants. There were some questions and confusion from each of the respondents. 
Specifically, they were asking for additional clarification, predominantly around the intensity of the 
hazard being discussed. 
Survey of Leadership 
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 Immediately following the completion of the annual KP-HVA scoring and the proposed financial 
calculations, each respondent was given a paper survey asked four questions.  
All four facility representatives agreed on three of the four items (Table 4):  
1. The data enhanced their knowledge of financial and operational vulnerabilities from disasters;  
2. The new data made the KP-HVA more meaningful to their leadership position; and 
3. The new additional data will help make a stronger case for justifying mitigation efforts and planning 
The timing of the additional data was intended to determine if the new additional information to 
be collected would increase the time it takes to complete the KP-HVA by more than 15 minutes. The 
survey showed that 75% of the participants said that the additional information took less than 15 minutes 
to complete, while the rural acute care hospital cited it took longer than 15 minutes to complete.  
  The conclusion of this survey reveals that healthcare leaders that participated in this study do see 
a benefit in the additional calculations, even when there is a lengthier time commitment for completion.  
Leadership participants were geninuely curious about the tools’ ability to anticipate financial and 














Table 4: Post Study Completion – Participant Survey Results  










(Response Choices) (Yes – No – Not Sure) (Yes – No – Not Sure) (Yes – No – Not Sure) (Yes – No – Not Sure) 
Leadership – Does 
new data enhance 




Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leadership – Does 
new data make KP-
HVA more 
meaningful to your 
position? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General – Do you 
feel as though this 
new additional data 
will help make a 
stronger case for 
mitigation efforts? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HVA Group – Did 
additional data input 
take less than <15 
minutes? 
No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Regional Healthcare Coalition 
 Results of the regional consortium survey indicate that there are some similarities and 
differences in responses from the different healthcare facility types, as well as the non-healthcare 
community participants.   
 The similarities across respondents shows the current summary of information on the risk 
assessment or HVA is meaningful to facility leadership. Additionally, across all respondents and facility 
types, a large majority use the HVA to determine the length of disruption of their services. A notable 
similarity across the majority of all healthcare providers, as well as non-healthcare entities is that they 
do not currently use their risk assessments to determine financial impacts from the potential hazards.  
 Identified differences amongst the different facility types are most notable in the responses for 
the use of the HVA to prioritize business continuity planning with 100% of skilled nursing facility 
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respondents answering that they use their HVA to determine business continuity planning while only 
22% of hospital respondents and 25% other healthcare facility types use the information for that 
purpose. 
 The collected survey was intended to illustrate basic views and uses of different healthcare 
facility types and non-healthcare entities. The survey shows that healthcare preparedness professionals 
in this consortium do feel as though the information summarized in the HVAs is useful to their 
leadership, for capturing financial and operational risks to their organizations is not something being 
calculated or represented in their hazard assessments.  
Table 5: Regional Healthcare C
oalition Survey Results 
 
(Question 3): Do you use the data from your risk assessment or HVA tool to prioritize business continuity 
planning?  
(Question 4): Do you use the data from your risk assessment or HVA tool to determine potential 
financial losses during a disaster?  
(Question 5): Do you determine the potential length of disruption of health services for the facility, 
based on the identified hazards in the HVA? 
(Question 9): Do you feel as though the current summary of information on the risk assessment or HVA 
is meaningful to facility leadership? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 9
Hospital 9 2 8 3 9 2 10 0
Skilled Nursing 7 0 4 3 6 1 3 0













 The intent of this doctoral project was to identify the inadequacies and shortfalls of the 
existing framework and regulations regarding the process for scoring and prioritizing risks and 
vulnerabilities to healthcare providers.  The identification of the gaps within the annual risk and 
hazard assessments led to development and incorporation of the new elements designed to 
overcome the identified shortfalls into the process and create more meaningful and compelling 
information regarding the risks and hazards, namely to identify: what do these risks and 
vulnerabilities mean to the organization. Quantifying the potential financial and operational 
impacts to a healthcare facility will help healthcare leadership make informed decisions about 
investing in mitigation measures to protect their facility before the storm, as well as supporting 
their operational decisions during a disaster. 
  Identifying and including the potential operational and financial impacts from each of the 
hazards on the Kaiser Permanente – HVA tool provides quantifiable comprehensive look into the 
impacts that hazards will have on a facility. The inclusion of projected length of disruption and 
financial losses from each hazard into the KP-HVA tool was identified through the survey as 
enhancing the purpose and understanding meaning of the annual risk assessment for healthcare 
leaders.   
 The various group participants and leadership for each of the different facility types 
overwhelmingly acknowledged the benefit that this additional information could make in 
prioritizing business continuity and resiliency planning, as well as in making operational 
decisions before, during, and after a disaster has impacted their facility. The conclusions of the 
pilot study and surveys show that there is a lack of utilization of the HVA, due largely to the lack 
of information compelling healthcare leadership to act on their identified risks and 
vulnerabilities.   
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Overview of Findings 
 The findings of this study suggest that various types of healthcare facilities and 
leadership understand the importance and intentions of completing risk and hazard assessments, 
but are unable to make the results of these tools minimize operational and financial risks to their 
facilities, as they are intended to do. Group discussions and results of the study suggest that there 
is a lack of meaning in the output of the existing risk and hazard assessment tools. Currently 
different individuals from all facility types outlined various ways of utilizing the collected data 
before, during, and after a disaster. The facilitated discussions led to a more thorough 
understanding of the impacts that disasters can have on their facilities, both short and long-term. 
 Facility leadership communicated that they feel more comfortable discussing risks to 
their facilities with quantitative projections of operational and financial impacts from the 
identified hazards. Additionally, leadership cited that in the past they often understood the 
hazards to their facilities and even some of the vulnerabilities; however, they felt as though there 
was a lack of communication to them regarding the next steps to minimize the presented risks. 
The Chief Opporating Officer of the acute care hospital revealed that cost-benefit analysis and 
proposals from departmetns were an everyday part of their responsibilities, making them feel 
more comfortable with numbers and projections in front of them to aide in their decisions. In his 
summary, he wants to know, what happens if we do not do this (mitigation efforts)?  
Research Question # 1 Findings 
This study set out to determine the benefits to healthcare facilities of prioritizing their 
business continuity planning efforts, for the research has shown that 48% of healthcare facilities 
as of 2017 felt as though they were not able to meet the requirement of creating business 
continuity plans. Research completed from this study has shown that through the identification of 
quantifiable operational and financial impacts to a facility, healthcare leadership is more likely to 
seek out risk reduction and mitigation strategies to lessen the impact that the hazards can have on 
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their facility. Leadership cited that the ability for them to reference quantifiable financial risks to 
the facility could be paired with a standard cost-benefit analysis to determine the financial 
feasibility of implementing risk reduction measures.   
Research Question # 2 Findings  
The additions to the KP-HVA tool illustrate that it is possible to calculate potential 
financial losses to a healthcare facility during disasters or interruptions to their normal 
operations. Additionally, the tool is able to determine the revenue generated each hour for the 
various facility types, meaning that even if the disruption of services were to last longer than 
initially anticipated, the facility could determine financial losses for the new length of disruption 
to their services. The various man-made, naturally occurring, and technological hazards that are 
included in the KP-HVA all have the potential to interrupt business operations, available 
services, and revenue streams. The new additions to the KP-HVA tool will allow healthcare 
facilities the ability to quantify those interruptions and impacts from the aforementioned hazards. 
 Research Question # 3 Findings 
Through the exploration of the pilot study and facilitated discussions following the completion of 
the study, the ability to utilize the financial and operational information to determine fiscal management 
policies and procedures was confirmed by financial analysts and facility leaders. This information 
prompts revisting business interruption insurance levels and quantify financial and operational 
disruptions to services by the different hazards identified in the KP-HVA tool.  Future versions should 
include additional clarification and instructions, predominantly around the intensity of the hazard being 
discussed. In addition, sample data estimating the length of disruption for hazards would help financial 
directors to better project the amount of time a facility could be impacted. 
Discussion of Results in Consideration of Future Research 
As enterprise-wide healthcare business continuity is still in the infancy stages of 
development, there are numerous areas within this field of study that could benefit from further 
research. The topics of disaster risk assessment and hazard vulnerability assessment on 
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healthcare facilities have been lacking in the field of academic research studies. The lack of 
research studies in the fields of risk and hazard assessments in healthcare has prompted 
skepticism and uncertainty regarding the required annual assessment. Lack of buy-in is 
especially true in healthcare leaders who are one of the intended audiences for the results of the 
assessment. 
The research from the collected pilot study survey responses shows that facility leadership 
appreciates and is more comfortable with objective financial and operational data, as this is what 
they are accustomed to when making other leadership decisions. Future research should 
incorporate this finding as a basis for additional research projects. The identification and 
customization of additional data in the presentation of risk and hazard assessments to a targeted 
audience of healthcare executives and decision-makers should be a priority, as these persons in 
healthcare are the ones who determine financial and organizational priorities. In addition, future 
studies should examine the accuracy of the projected data such as the estimated hours of 
disruption that occur in a healthcare facility during a disaster. A discussion item identified in the 
ACH group discussion was the feasibility of projecting patient satisfaction scores or Hospital 
Consumer Assessment of Healthare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) following a disaster. The 
recommendation for this potential inclusion into facility predictions of the risks stems from the 
HCAHPS score being tied to CMS reimbursements, meaning potential additional financial 
impacts (short-term and long-term) that these various hazards can have on an facility.  
Implications of the Study 
 The financial and operational impacts that hazards have on healthcare facilities continue 
to rise. While healthcare facilities have been required to complete an annual risk and 
vulnerability assessment for nearly two decades. The information being collected and 
understanding of the intended audiences have not minimized the impacts that hazards have on 
healthcare organizations since the regulatory mandate went into effect. The continued increase in 
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operational interruptions from hazards, despite this mandate, has led to the evaluation and 
questioning of existing risk identification efforts. 
 The inability of healthcare facilities to meet the new business continuity planning 
standard could have severe regulatory financial penalities, in addition to the financial losses of a 
disaster. CMS outlines that any participating facilities that receive reimbursements from their 
program must meet the new standard, or they are in immediate jeopardy of having their 
reimbursements withheld.  
 The finding of the research has shown that the decision makers within healthcare 
organizations feel more comfortable when they have comprehensive and quantifiable 
information when making operational and financial decisions for the organization. With this 
information healthcare leaders feel as though they are better able to determine the need for pre-
disaster mitigation efforts, operational decisions during the disaster, and post-event recovery 
actions.  
 The incorporation of more objective and quantifiable information into existing mandated 
risk and hazard assessment tools will reduce misunderstanding, and increase usefulness of the 
annual risk assessments, and better addressing the identified needs of healthcare executives in 
making informed decisions regarding the operational and financial security of their facilities.  
Policy Implications  
 The literature review and results of this study show that healthcare facilities and leaders 
consider business continuity planning as a top priority for their organizations, despite the 
prediction that they will not being able to address this requirement (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). The lack of confidence of healthcare facilities 
to meet this new CMS requirement of implementing and maintaining a business continuity plan 
suggests the need for additional guidance. The ability of the leaders to prioritize their business 
continuity planning efforts will help healthcare facilities focus their efforts on the identified top 
hazards to their facility.  
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 Existing annual regulatory requirements have facilities prioritizing their risks and hazards 
in order to focus on hazard mitigation and inform planning efforts of healthcare facilities. The 
aforementioned addition to the widely used KP-HVA tool could help prioritize business 
continuity planning, in the same way that mitigation and planning efforts are prioritized with the 
intention of helping healthcare facilities focus on the top vulnerabilities of their facilities.  
 The intent of the additional information in the KP-HVA tool is to mimic the requirement 
of the current annual HVA, but with the identification of risks and vulnerabilities to the business 
and operational aspects of the healthcare facility. An emphasis on annually re-evaluating the 
priorities of business continuity should be combined with the annual re-evaluation of risks to the 
healthcare organization. With the changing of business continuity planning to one of the top four 
priorities for healthcare facilities to focus on in 2017-2022, the ability to guide healthcare 
facilities in the prioritization of this undertaking should be made available. As risks to a 
healthcare organization change, so do business continuity priorities. Annual review and 
prioritization will help enable healthcare facilities to focus on the needed efforts to make their 
facilities more resilient during disasters. 
Recommendations 
 If the facility is seeking a more detailed analysis of losses per each department, the 
survey tool should be filled out by each department leader and support team, and then the 
collected information can be used independently or collectively. The inclusion of all departments 
in this process would provide greater detail into the interruptions and possible additional 
expenses from disasters; however, the ability to engage all departments within a facility could be 
logistically difficult and time consuming for both the departments and the group collecting the 
information.  
 As recommended by the surveyed outpatient surgery department, the capturing of actual 
disruption lengths, financial , and additional expenses from events would be beneficial to this 
tool.  Continued tracking and capturing of events throughout the year in keeping with these 
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elements added to the KP-HVA tool, would enable facilities to collate needed information to 
better project impacts of hazards. 
 This proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool was constructed in collaboration with the 
Director of Business Continuity and Emergency Preparedness at Kaiser Permanente and subject 
matter experts in the field of healthcare business continuity and preparedness. The collaboration 
is intended to potentially release a new optional version of the KP-HVA tool, allowing the user 
to determine an operational and financial impact projection to accompany their ranking hazards. 
As this dissertation is meant to add to the preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery efforts 
of healthcare providers, all works and collaborations will be made publicly available for 
providers to use at their discretion.  
 The proposed additions to the KP-HVA tool are intended to engage healthcare leadership, 
risk managers, and financial analysts within the facility to make the existing information and 
ranking of hazards more meaningful to intended audiences. By projecting and presenting the 
operational and financial risks a hazard may have on the facility, a clear overview of hazard 
impacts upon the facility will help prioritize business continuity planning and mitigation efforts 
with the intent of lessening the impacts of these hazards. In addition to prioritizing efforts, the 
new quantitative information will help facility leadership make informed decisions to protect 
their facility from the threat of a hazard. 
Limitations of the Study  
 The study employed a scoping review of archival published texts and data to answer the 
study questions. This method of research was chosen due to the limited sources of published 
articles and data on this subject due to the infancy of this new federal mandate. This 
methodology allowed for a review of available literature directed to healthcare organizations and 
the general public on this topic, both in regulatory guidance and published texts. The primary 
limitation of this study is the dependence on publications of this topic, as well as the nature of 
government regulatory guidance documents. 
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With limited guidance and research being available for reference, the review of the 
literature and scholarly articles was limited due to healthcare business continuity being an 
emerging topic. Most of the literature in this field is about healthcare information services and 
technology business continuity and disaster recovery planning, as a specific sub-topic of the 
broader topic of enterprise-wide healthcare business continuity. The literature and background of 
the healthcare information services continuity planning were reviewed, with some consideration 
of similar findings incorporated into this project.  
 The pilot study portion of this project was limited to one health system with identification 
of four different healthcare provider types to determine the validity of this effort to the most 
prominent healthcare provider types. While the four healthcare provider types were piloted 
successfully, there are a remaining thirteen different provider types that were not included in this 
pilot project. Additionally, with the pilot study being composed of facilities within one 
healthcare organization, there could be varying characteristics and variables in other healthcare 
organizations that might skew or alter the intent and/or output of the information being collected. 
Differing financial and budgeting reporting and projecting tools as well as differing 
organizational business priorities could affect the usability of this tool. 
Conclusion 
 The need for healthcare providers to be more operationally and financially resilient from 
the effects of both man-made and naturally occurring disasters, as well as technological hazards 
is apparent, as healthcare providers have continued to falter during and following disasters over 
the past two decades, despite efforts to identify, prioritize, and mitigate their hazards. As 
healthcare’s financial modeling and regulatory landscapes continue to evolve, interruptions in 
provided services may create financial and regulatory hardships for healthcare providers.  
 As outlined in the final rule by CMS, operational and business continuity planning and 
ability is listed as one of the top three priorities identified for healthcare providers to incorporate 
into their emergency preparedness planning. The recent release of the final rule in November of 
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2017 has tied business continuity planning to federal reimbursement funds, making the penalty 
for non-compliance by providers more severe.  
As enterprise-wide healthcare business continuity planning and the federal CMS 
guidance regarding this requirement are still in the infancy stages, the long-term outlook and 
compliance ratings of this effort are still largely unknown. While the future of business 
continuity planning in healthcare is still largely unknown, the refining of risk and hazard 
identification and of prioritization in healthcare is present in nearly every facet of healthcare. 
Truly minimizing the impacts that risks and hazards may have on an organization requires more 
than the identification and prioritization of risks. It requires that the scoring of those risks is 
meaningful and actionable by healthcare leaders. In order to evoke action and needed change to 
mitigate hazards and risks to the organization, leaders need to understand the information and 
implications of the information being presented in a format that they understand. Healthcare 
leaders are compelled by objective and quantifiable data regarding operations and finances,and 
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Appendix: Kaiser Permenente Emergency Management Tool 
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Proposed Addition to Kaiser Permanente HVA Tool – Financial Impact Data Input Tab
 
 
0 Est. $ Loss
TOP 10 HVA - FINANCIAL IMPACTS RANK LOD  - Inpatient LOD - Outpatient LOD - ER Inpatient $ Loss Outpatient $ Loss ER $ Loss
1 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
2 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
3 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
4 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
5 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
6 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
7 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
8 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
9 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
10 0 0 0 $ $ $ $
Total Hourly Revenue Per Service Type $ $ $ $
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Facility Name  
Person Filling Out Form XXXXXXXX 
Facility Leader XXXXXXXX 
Facility Financial Director XXXXXXXX 
 Inpatient Outpatient Emergency Room 
Projected Annual Gross 
Revenue ($) 
$ $ $ 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
   
 Inpatient Outpatient ER 
Hours/Week    
(Hours) Inpatient Outpatient ER 
Event 1 0 0 0 
Event 2 0 0 0 
Event 3 0 0 0 
% Svcs 
Functional 
Inpatient Outpatient ER 
Event 1 0 0 0 
Event 2 0 0 0 
Event 3 0 0 0 
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Facility Data Collection 2 of 2 











Inpatient Outpatient ER 
Event 1 0 0 0 
Event 2 0 0 0 















Event 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Event 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Event 3 $0 $0 $0 $0 
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